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1. Introduction 
 
Within a span of 20 years, the electric power industry has become the central focus of 
two extraordinary policy trends, each one significant enough to fundamentally reshape the 
industry. One of these trends is liberalization, a term that has come to encompass both 
privatization and regulatory restructuring. Beginning with the visions articulated in such works 
as Joskow and Schmalansee (1985) and Schweppe et al. (1988), the restructuring movement in 
electricity can be viewed as an extension of the trend toward market liberalization that had 
previously transformed the airline, communications, and natural gas industries. The generation 
sector of the industry has undergone a sporadic but inexorable transition from economic 
regulation under cost-of-service principles to an environment in which markets heavily 
influence, if not dominate, the remuneration and investment decisions of firms.  
The second trend to engulf the electricity industry has been the growth of the environmental 
movement. More specifically, the growing alarm over the threat of global climate change, and 
the more recent engagement of policymakers in combating it, is likely to dominate decision 
making in the power industry over the next several decades. Electricity and heat production are 
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responsible for 40% of CO2 emissions in the United States and about 31% worldwide (Stern 
2006). 
 Although not obvious at first glance, these two trends, restructuring and environmental 
regulation, share many common ideological roots. In the United States, the growing stringency in 
air quality regulation was accompanied by an increased acceptance of market-based 
environmental regulations. These include cap-and-trade mechanisms, such as the program put in 
place to limit SO2 emissions under the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (Ellerman et al. 
2000).  Regulators were also interested in experimenting with market-based incentives to 
promote alternative energy sources. Many trace the birth of the U.S. independent power industry 
to the passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act  (PURPA) in 1978. The PURPA 
legislation established mandates for the purchase of energy produced by qualifying small and 
renewable sources of generation (Joskow 1997; Kahn 1988). Although inspired largely by 
environmental and energy security goals, the largest impact of PURPA is arguably in the 
resulting demonstration of the viability of smaller-capacity generation technologies and the 
nonutility generator business model. 
 One important aspect of the independent power producer business model was the relative 
freedom—and risk—allowed in investment of new facilities. Investments are based on market-
based long-term contracts and projections of market revenues, rather than regulatory findings of 
need and guaranteed cost recovery. The restructuring movement in the United States was led by 
states with the worst track records in utility investment (Ando and Palmer 1998).  Although 
evidence suggests that operations have become more efficient in these states (Wolfram 2005), 
restructuring was primarily intended to improve the incentives of firms to make prudent 
investments (Borenstein and Bushnell 2000). In some parts of the world, this general approach to 
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investment has come to dominate the industry. In many others, policymakers continue to search 
for the proper tools for balancing market incentives with concerns over reliability and adequacy 
of investment (Joskow 2005; Oren 2005). One central aspect of this search concerns the design 
of wholesale electricity markets and the payment streams they provide to suppliers. Markets can 
differ greatly on the primary sources of remuneration for generators, with some relying on 
energy and ancillary services markets, while others have established mechanisms for 
compensating suppliers for their installed or available capacity (Bushnell 2005; Cramton and 
Stoft 2005). 
This chapter studies the intersection of these two trends as they come to dominate the economics 
of the industry. In particular, it examines how the increasing penetration of intermittent 
renewable generation can change the economic landscape for merchant power investment in 
conventional thermal generation. Currently, renewable generation earns revenues from a wide 
range of sources, from energy markets to government tax credits. The impact of renewable 
generation on the electricity markets in which they participate has to date been relatively modest 
outside of regions of high concentration such as west Texas. That will almost certainly change, 
however, as state and federal policies considerably ramp up the amount of renewable generation 
throughout the country. This can have a profound impact on prices and the economics of supply 
for both renewable and nonrenewable generation. 
An equilibrium model of generation investment is developed, based on the long-standing 
principles of finding the optimal mix of capital intensive and higher marginal cost resources to 
serve a market with fluctuating demand. This model is then applied to data on electricity markets 
from several regions of the western United States to examine how the interaction of increasing 
wind capacity and electricity market design affects the equilibrium mix of thermal capacity and 
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the revenues earned by renewable suppliers. The chapter first provides a brief background on this 
question,  then describes the equilibrium conditions that form the stylized investment model. 
Next, it details the data and assumptions used in the study. The final section contains the bulk of 
the results and analysis.  
 
2. Background: Renewable Energy in Restructured Electricity Markets 
 
Renewable, or green, power is viewed by many policymakers as the key to combating 
greenhouse gas emissions within the power sector. Explicit and implicit subsidies for renewable 
power continue to grow. By the end of 2007, 25 U.S. states and Washington, DC, had some form 
of renewable portfolio standard (RPS), which requires purchasers of wholesale electricity to 
procure some percentage of their power from renewable sources (Wiser and Barbose 2008). The 
long-standing, but intermittent and precarious, production tax credit (PTC) for wind energy in 
the United States pays wind producers 2.1 cents/kWh for energy production. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 contained several provisions favorable to renewable 
generation, including the extension of the PTC until 2012 and alternative investment tax credits 
for facilities constructed in 2009 and 2010 (Wiser and Bolinger 2009). 
For the industry as a whole, the growth of nonutility generation has coincided with the expansion 
of renewable generation sources. This is not the product of happenstance; from the passage of 
PURPA, various legislative purchasing mandates and tax incentives played a dominant role in 
the growth of both renewable and nonutility generation. To this day, the renewable industry is 
dominated by nonutility producers.1 
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The subsidization of renewable generation is expanding in parallel with efforts to create cap-and-
trade programs for CO2. This can be seen as antithetical to the spirit of a cap-and-trade program, 
where promoting flexibility in compliance options is a central ideal. Unlike the SO2 program, 
cap-and-trade is but one of a broad set of policy tools being brought to bear against greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. Some view this as undermining the strength of cap-and-trade regulation. 
The cap has less incremental impact if much of the GHG reductions are already accounted for 
under various more directed measures and regulations. In regions such as California, cap-and-
trade is viewed more as a backstop than as a bulwark in combating climate change.  
Although policies that promote renewable generation sources are extremely popular with 
regulators, politicians, and the general public, their continued expansion to unprecedented levels 
does raise some concerns. One source of concern is cost. Although the technological frontier 
continues to advance, much controversy exists over the appropriate timing and form of policy 
intervention to promote renewable generation. Most accept that renewable generation would not 
be a significant source of supply today if not for some form of public support. The fact that the 
external cost of GHG emissions have not yet been priced into the investment decisions of fossil-
based generation firms certainly provides justification for support of renewable power, but the 
prospect of regional and possibly national caps on CO2 emissions undermines that justification. 
A common argument for support of renewable generation is the hope that expansion of supply 
will yield learning benefits, thereby lowering costs of future supply. However, a market failure 
exists only if that learning cannot be appropriated for private gain.  Although the bulk of public 
support for renewable generation has taken the form of production mandates or credits, it is not 
clear whether commercialization is the point in the supply chain where the problem of 
intellectual property is most acute. Further, the evidence to date indicates that cost reductions in 
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alternative energy sources can be driven as much by exogenous technology developments as by 
the expansion of installed capacity (Nemet 2006). 
 The most commonly heard concern over the rapid expansion of renewable electricity 
supply is over the fact that this supply is available only intermittently (NERC 2009). With the 
prospect of one-fifth or more of electrical energy coming from intermittent sources, many in the 
industry are confronting the fact that the traditional tools for planning for and providing reliable 
electric service may prove inadequate. In fact, as discussed below, the traditional utility planning 
paradigm has been disrupted by market liberalization over the last 10 years. The industry has yet 
to settle on a single framework to replace utility planning. The large-scale addition of 
intermittent resources is therefore happening against a backdrop in which the mechanisms 
through which generators are compensated are very much in flux.  
 
3. Investment in Restructured Electricity Markets 
 
Since the onset of market liberalization, concerns have been raised that the newly formed 
market regimes would fail to produce adequate investment in generation capacity. Ironically, in 
many parts of the world, it was the cost of excess capacity that provided the impetus for 
liberalization. The safety net of guaranteed capital cost recovery in both publicly owned and rate-
of-return regulated utilities had provided a high degree of reliability. Indeed, the reliability of 
electric supply in most OECD countries is so high that it is often taken for granted. U.S. 
electricity consumers, unlike those in many developing countries, fully expect to be able to 
consume as much electricity as they need whenever they desire.  
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 These high levels of reliability came at a high cost, however, particularly when combined 
with the weak incentives for cost control provided by public ownership and regulation. Under the 
traditional model, a utility and its regulators jointly forecast a “need” for investment, and the 
regulator would guarantee the recovery of costs undertaken to meet that need. In the liberalized 
market, private firms no longer receive a guaranteed recovery of their investments. One of the 
hopes for liberalization was that this market-based risk would lead to more prudent and cost-
effective investment decisions. At the very least, it was observed, the costs of overinvestment 
would be borne by investors rather than ratepayers under the new market regime. In many 
markets, this latter belief has been supported by the fact that many of the firms that procured or 
expanded capacity in liberalized markets experienced severe financial difficulties during the 
early part of this decade.  
 Whereas a transition away from payments based on a cost-of-service framework is shared 
by all liberalized markets, the revenue streams that replaced these payments differ greatly. Many 
markets focus the remuneration of generators on the provision of energy and related services. In 
the jargon of the U.S. electricity industry, this conceptual framework has been referred to as an 
“energy-only” framework. The name, which is somewhat inaccurate, refers to the fact that 
contributions against fixed and sunk costs arise only from payments for the provision of either 
energy or associated operating reserve services. Although no market is fully unconstrained in this 
way, markets such as those found in the United Kingdom, Australia, Texas, New Zealand, and 
Norway operate under general energy-only principles to the extent that they have no or relatively 
high price caps and provide no other specific payments for the supply of capacity. 
In many markets, however, the revenues provided from the provision of energy and ancillary 
services appear to be insufficient to cover the fixed cost of new entry (Joskow 2005).  Myriad 
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reasons can be given for this, including the existence of price caps, the subtle but significant 
impact of the decisions of system operators on market prices, and simply the over investment of 
capacity. This and other factors have led to a level of discomfort among many policymakers over 
leaving investment decisions entirely up to the market. Therefore, many electricity markets, 
including several in the United States, provide payments for capacity “availability” that 
supplement revenues received for the provision of energy and ancillary services. This feature is 
not unique to the United States, as capacity payments played a significant role in the early years 
of market liberalization in the United Kingdom and continue to be a significant factor in Spain 
and Colombia.  
The details of these capacity payments vary, but the general common features that are 
represented in the stylized model used here are a formal or informal constraint on energy prices 
combined with a fixed payment (here assumed to be in dollars per megawatt-year) based on 
installed capacity. The fixed payments can be scaled according to the expected or historic 
availability of generation, a fact most significant for wind generation sources. 
In many restructured markets, some form of payment for installed or available capacity is made 
to producers as a supplement to the revenues they earn through the sale of energy and ancillary 
services. These payments are not without controversy, however, as debate continues over how 
exactly to measure and remunerate the provision of “reliable” capacity (Cramton 2003; Hogan 
2005; Oren 2005). 
 One aspect of this debate is how to deal with unconventional sources of generation. 
Resources, such as hydroelectric facilities, that are energy-limited cannot produce at their full 
capacity all the time. Many renewable resources can supply power only intermittently, and their 
supply is dependent on ambient conditions rather than under the control of the operator. In 
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general, the capacity payments made to resources such as these are scaled downward according 
to rough probabilistic measures of their potential availability. As explored below, the 
specification of such rules will interact with the level of penetration of renewable generation to 
shift the relative value of different types of payment streams for intermittent producers.  
 The power industry today therefore features two contrasting models for financing new 
investment: the energy-only model, which relies on periodic, extremely high prices for energy 
and ancillary services to provide the scarcity rents that are applied to the recovery of capital 
costs; and the capacity payment model, in which a large portion of the capital costs are recovered 
through capacity payments. Under energy-only markets, the choice and profitability of specific 
generation sources will depend on the degree and timing of high prices. Under capacity markets, 
the spot energy prices are somewhat less critical, but the specific implementation of capacity 
payments is very important to the relative profitability of technologies.  
The large-scale deployment of intermittent resources can imply a major paradigm shift for both 
investment models. Electric systems will likely experience a massive addition of renewable 
generation capacity that is largely motivated by nonmarket considerations such as climate 
change. This will result in an influx of energy with extremely low marginal cost, but only during 
some time periods. As a result, the remaining need for thermal generation capacity could look 
very different than it would in the absence of the renewable capacity. In market terms, the levels 
and patterns of energy prices could be quite different with the addition of renewables. The 
months and hours that experience peak prices will be driven as much by the availability of 
intermittent resources as by the fluctuations in end-use demand. These questions are explored 
empirically in the following section. 
   
 10 
4. Equilibrium Model of Electricity Investment 
 
This section uses a long-run equilibrium model of investment to explore the ramifications of 
greatly expanded intermittent supply. A technical formulation of the model is provided in the 
appendix at the end of this chapter. The model draws from the classic framework of utility 
investment, which applies a mix of technologies of varying capital intensity to satisfy fluctuating 
demand (see Kahn 1988). This demand is often represented in a load-duration curve, which 
illustrates a cumulative distribution of demand levels over some time period, such as one year. 
This basic model is expanded to incorporate elements of peak load pricing as articulated in 
theory by Borenstein (2005).  The model examines the mix and cost of technologies that achieve 
the break-even point where annual energy revenues for each technology equal their annualized 
cost of capacity. As in Borenstein (2005), these values depend on prices rising above the 
marginal cost of the highest-cost technologies where, in effect, demand sets the market price. 
This process has come to be called “scarcity pricing” in wholesale electricity markets. Similar to 
Lamont (2008), the model also incorporates intermittent resources. As described below, the wind 
production profiles used here are based on specific projections of wind production profiles, 
rather than stylized correlation coefficients used by Lamont.  
The model here assumes perfect competition, essentially free entry into any generation 
technology in the markets, and also disregard concerns of “lumpiness” of capacity. Firms are free 
to install any combination of capacity sizes that satisfy differentiable equilibrium conditions. 
This greatly simplifies computational concerns and, in light of the size of the markets being 
examined here, is not an unreasonable assumption. As this is a long-term model, it also ignores 
operational constraints such as minimum run times, start costs, and ramping rates. These are 
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obviously important considerations of operating an electricity system that will be affected by the 
expansion of intermittent technologies, but they are beyond the capabilities of the model used 
here.  
The approach of the model is to examine the actual load profiles or hourly distributions of 
demand of certain markets, and then impose varying levels of intermittent wind production on 
those demand distributions. In other words, the wind investment is considered exogenous to the 
equilibrium investment model, having been implemented through nonmarket constraints such as 
a renewable portfolio standard. The model then derives the mix of thermal technologies that 
would be constructed to serve the resulting residual demand that is left over after accounting for 
wind production. The equilibrium resulting from an assumption of competitive entry and no 
lumpiness is equivalent to the optimal, or least-cost, set of technologies. The intuition behind the 
equilibrium constraints described in the appendix is straightforward. Firms will continue to 
construct additional capacity in a given thermal technology as long as the revenues implied by 
the residual demand are sufficient to cover a levelized cost of investment, as well as operating 
costs.  
The empirical calculations are based on data taken from the Western Electricity Coordinating 
Council (WECC) for the reference year 2007. These data are in turn subdivided into the four 
WECC subregions:  the California (CA) region; the Northwest Power Pool (NWPP) region; the 
southwest (AZNM) region, made up mostly of Arizona and New Mexico; and the Rocky 
Mountain Power Pool (RMPP) region (see Figure 9.1).  
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Figure 9.1. The four WECC subregions 
[INSERT FIGURE 9.1 HERE] 
 
 The general approach is to ask how electricity load would have looked during 2007 under 
various levels of wind penetration. The model then solves for the equilibrium investment mix of 
conventional technologies that optimally serves the resulting load shape. This section includes 
descriptions of the data sources and assumptions used in implementing this calculation. 
It is important to keep in mind that this is not a simulation of the incremental investment 
required going forward in these markets, but rather an exercise that examines how the long-run 
equilibrium mix of generation and costs would change. Thus it is not meant to be predictive of 
these actual markets, but uses these market data to develop calculations for a range of possible 
representative markets. The market-based model assumes that all regions are restructured (when 
in fact, only California is currently even partially restructured) and that the investment choices 
are starting from a clean slate of no existing capacity.  
One difficulty with simulating electricity markets in a high level of detail is that, although data 
on most fossil-fuel based generation units are quite extensive and reliable, far less data exist on 
the activities of hydroelectric plants, renewable generation, and the substantial amount of power 
generated from combined heat and power (CHP) or cogeneration plants. When building a 
counterfactual re-creation of an electricity market, these data gaps make assumptions about the 
missing production necessary.  
This chapter takes the approach of restricting the construction of a counterfactual market 
outcome to the portion of resources for which detailed data are available. In effect, it assumes 
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that, under the counterfactual assumptions of wind penetration, the operations of nonmodeled 
generation plants would not have changed. The total production from “clean” sources is unlikely 
to change in the short run. The production of electricity missing from the data is driven by 
natural resource availability (rain, wind, sun) or, in the case of CHP, to nonelectricity production 
decisions. The economics of production are such that these sources are essentially producing all 
the power they can. However, it is important to recognize that this modeling approach assumes 
that existing unconventional sources will not change not only how much they produce, but also 
when they produce it. This is a problematic assumption in regions with substantial hydro 
resources, such as the Pacific Northwest. Ideally, an investment analysis would involve a co-
optimization of hydro, wind, and thermal electric production. This is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. For this reason, the results pertaining to the Pacific Northwest region should be 
interpreted with this shortcoming in mind.  
In any event, the goal here is not to reproduce the electric system as it actually operated in 2007, 
but rather to assess how investment decisions would play out if the industry were starting from a 
completely clean slate and faced the residual (after existing unconventional generation) load 
shapes of 2007. The data used here are meant to convey conditions present in representative 
electricity systems, rather than completely reproduce a specific system.  
 
4.1 Demand Data 
 
The primary data source for this discussion is the BASECASE dataset from Platts, which is in 
turn derived primarily from the continuous emissions monitoring system (CEMS) used by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to monitor the emissions of large stationary 
sources.2 Almost all large fossil-fired electricity generation sources are included in this dataset, 
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although hydroelectric, renewable, and some small fossil generation sources are missing. The 
CEMS reports hourly data on several aspects of production and emissions. Hourly data on 
nuclear generation plants are included with fossil generation data in the BASECASE dataset. The 
model here uses the hourly generation output and carbon emissions for available facilities. 
These hourly output data are aggregated by firm and region to develop the demand in the 
simulation model. As described above, this is in fact a residual demand: the demand that is left 
after applying the output from non-CEMS plants. Plant cost, capacity, and availability 
characteristics and regional fuel prices are then taken from the Platts POWERDAT dataset. 
These data are in turn derived from mandatory industry reporting to the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) and North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC).  
These data are then combined to create a demand profile and supply functions for periods in the 
simulation. Although hourly data are available, for computational reasons these are aggregated 
into representative time periods. Each of the four seasons has 50 such periods, yielding 200 
explicitly modeled time periods. The aggregation of hourly data was based on a sorting of the 
California residual demand. California aggregate production was sorted into 50 bins based on 
equal MW spreads between the minimum and maximum production levels observed in the 2007 
sample year. A time period in the simulation therefore is based on the mean of the relevant 
market data for all actual 2007 data that fall within the bounds of each bin. For example, every 
actual hour (of which there were 14) during spring 2007 in which California CEMS production 
fell between 7,040 and 7,243 MW were combined into a single representative hour for 
simulation purposes.  
The number of season-hour observations in each bin is therefore unbalanced; there are relatively 
few observations in the highest and lowest production levels, and more closer to the median 
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levels. The demand levels used in the simulation are then based on the mean production levels 
observed in each bin. In order to calculate aggregate production and revenues, the resulting 
outputs for each simulated demand level was multiplied by the number of actual market hours 
used to produce the input for that simulated demand level. Table 1 presents summary statistics of 
CEMS load levels for each of the four WECC subregions. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of demand  
  CEMS load   (MW)  
Region Mean  Min. Max. S.D. 
     
CA 13,216 6,022 29,985 3,626 
NWPP 15,334 9,670 18,884 2,400 
AZNM 17,942 13,626 25,586 2,706 
RMPP 6,986 5,531 9,141 723 
     
 
 
Note: MW = megawatts; S.D. = standard deviation 
 
4.2 Wind Generation Data 
The wind generation profiles used in this chapter come from WECC transmission planning 
studies. The WECC studied several scenarios for renewable energy penetration (see Nickell 
2008), with particular focus on an assumption of 15% of total WECC energy being provided 
from renewable sources. This modeling effort employed a dataset from the National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory (NREL) that provides 10-minute wind speeds with a high level of geographic 
resolution throughout the U.S. portion of the WECC system. The WECC study combines these 
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wind potential data with other local sources of information to construct projections of new wind 
development, as well as of hourly wind production from those potential new sources. 
This chapter draws on the hourly load profiles of the projected wind facilities from the WECC 
study and aggregates these profiles according to the four WECC subregions described above. 
Because of the focus here on the investment impacts of wind penetration, this section looks at the 
baseline level of estimated production used in the WECC study and also a level that is double 
that used in the WECC study. The aggregate generation levels are summarized in Table 2. As a 
portion of CEMS load, the new wind sources would account for about 15% of 2007 CEMS 
energy, although these resources are not evenly distributed across the WECC.3 The RMPP area, 
which includes the wind-rich areas of Wyoming, has a great deal of wind potential, whereas the 
desert Southwest has much less.  
 
Table 2. Aggregate generation levels 
 Hourly averages 
Region 
Load  
(MWh) 
Wind 
(MWh) Share 
High wind 
(MWh)  Share 
      
CA 13,216 1,866 14% 3,733 28% 
NWPP 15,334 2,229 15% 4,458 29% 
AZNM 17,942 1,445 8% 2,891 16% 
RMPP 6,986 1,902 27% 3,804 54% 
Totals 53,479 7,443 14% 14,885 28% 
      
 
Note: MWh = megawatt-hours 
 
When the projected additional wind production is combined with and assumed to displace CEMS 
production, the result is a sharply shifted residual load profile that must be served by 
conventional generation sources. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the hourly CEMS load, both before 
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and after accounting for the additional wind resources for the months of September and 
December.  
Figure 2. CEMS load and wind production for July  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
 
Figure 3. CEMS load and wind production for December 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
The aggregate effects are well summarized by load duration curves presenting the cumulative 
distribution of CEMS load and residual demand after new wind sources. Figure 4 presents these 
load duration curves for the four subregions.  
 
Figure 4. Annual distribution of CEMS load net of wind 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
The CEMS load profile in California is much more variable than in other regions, while CEMS 
load levels in the Pacific Northwest are relatively constant because of the abundance of hydro 
energy in that region. In all cases, the increasing penetration of wind resources makes the load 
profiles steeper. This reflects the fact that wind production is not correlated with CEMS load. To 
the extent that more wind production is generated in low CEMS load hours, the residual load 
becomes more variable and the load duration curve steeper. This effect is most pronounced in the 
RMPP region, where CEMS load was relatively constant but which experiences the highest 
degree of wind penetration.  
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The market implications of Figure 4 are central to the results of this chapter, so they deserve a 
little further discussion. The increasing penetration of wind resources in the WECC will create a 
surge of energy supply, much of which will be uncorrelated with end-use demand. The net result 
is a residual load shape that is more “peaky.” As will be demonstrated in the results of the 
simulations, the optimal mix of resources to serve this profile of residual demand will be 
composed of a far greater share of low-capacity-cost, high-marginal-cost peaking resources.  
 
4.3 Thermal Generation Cost Data 
The model here examines the optimal possible mix of generation technologies, assuming it starts 
from a clean slate, with no sunk (or stranded) investment decisions. This section examines the 
optimal mix of three basic technologies that form the backbone of most U.S. electric systems. 
Each represents different levels of the trade-off between capital costs and marginal costs. 
Included are a base load pulverized coal technology, a midmerit combined cycle gas turbine 
(CCGT) technology, and a peaking gas combustion turbine (CT). The costs of construction and 
operation for each of these technologies are taken from the Energy Information Administration’s 
2007 annual energy outlook (EIA 2007).  The basic cost characteristics, taken from the EIA 
study, are summarized in Table 3.  To convert these costs to an annualized fixed cost, a 15-year 
payback period and 10% financing cost are assumed. Fuel costs are taken from the EIA’s figures 
for 2007. The resulting aggregate (including operating and maintenance) costs are summarized in 
Table 4.  
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Table 3. Thermal generation costs from EIA 
  Total overnight Fixed O&M 
Variable 
O&M HR 
  
cost  
($/kW) ($/kW) ($/MWh) Btu/kWh 
Scrubbed new coal 2,058 27.53 4.59 9,200 
CCGT  962 12.48 2.07 7,200 
CT 670 12.11 3.57 10,800 
 
Source: EIA 2007 
Notes: O&M = operating and maintenance costs; HR = Heat Rate 
 
Table 4. Thermal generation costs used in simulations 
 Total  Total 
 annual fixed Fuel costs marginal 
 
cost  
($/kWy) ($/MMBtu) 
cost 
($/MWh) 
Coal 282.17 1.74 20.60 
CCGT 136.57 7.06 52.90 
CT 98.51 7.06 79.82 
 
Note: kWy = kilowatt-year 
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5. Analysis and Results  
Using the data described in the previous section, the resulting optimal mix and level of 
generation capacity are calculated for each of the four WECC subregions. For the purposes of 
this study, each region is treated as isolated from the others. This is equivalent to assuming that 
transmission flows among the regions do not change from their 2007 levels. As described above, 
the four regions represent a wide spectrum in terms of current demand for generation and future 
wind potential.  
 
5.1 Energy-Only Market 
The results are first examined under an assumption that each region operates under an energy-
only market paradigm, with no price cap and no capacity payments. The analysis begins with the 
equilibrium energy prices in each market. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the hourly market-clearing 
energy prices in each market for the final week of August and first week of December. Note that 
these prices are plotted on a logarithmic scale, reflecting the highly volatile nature of equilibrium 
electricity prices in an energy-only market. Although significant differences in energy prices are 
difficult to detect in CA, the impact of wind penetration is clear on the pricing patterns in regions 
such as the NWPP and RMPP.  
 
Figure 5. Energy market prices for August  
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
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Figure 6. Energy market prices for December  
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
 
The changes in the residual demand profiles and the resulting equilibrium prices do have a 
significant effect. Figure 7 summarizes the equilibrium investment levels under three wind 
scenarios: wind at 2007 levels, wind at 14% of CEMS load, and wind at 28% of CEMS load.  
 
Figure 7. Equilibrium capacity for energy-only market 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE] 
 
Several aspects of the results are reflected in Figure 7.  First, the already volatile CA load profile 
implies an optimal mix of relatively little base load generation compared with the other regions, 
whereas the very consistent load of the NWPP implies an optimal mix that is heavily base load, 
with no peaking resources at all under the baseline scenario. Second, the increasing penetration 
of wind resources produces a clear shift of investment toward less capital-intensive peaking 
resources in every market. This shift is most pronounced in the RMPP region, where wind 
penetration is the greatest as a percentage of baseline CEMS load. Third, less thermal capacity is 
needed in every market as a reflection of the fact that wind generation has lowered the residual 
demand required to be served by thermal sources. However, the equilibrium thermal capacity 
requirement is reduced only modestly by the entry of new wind capacity. 
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These factors are summarized in Table 5. For each region, the aggregate equilibrium thermal 
capacity and assumed wind capacity are given in the first two columns of figures. The assumed 
average capacity factor, taken from the wind profiles from the WECC study is given in the next 
column, and the shares of thermal capacity that are base load and peaking are given in the last 
two columns. Note that the large levels of new wind capacity, those of more than 10 gigawatts 
(GW), result in reductions of equilibrium thermal capacity of only 1 to 2 GW.  
 
Table 5. Equilibrium results for energy-only market  
 Thermal New wind 
Wind 
capacity Share Share 
 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Capacity 
(MW) factor Coal CT 
 23,308 NA NA 43% 44% 
CA 22,753 5,670 33% 36% 50% 
 22,442 11,340 33% 28% 55% 
      
 14,472 NA NA 93% 0% 
NWPP 13,188 7,890 28% 81% 4% 
 12,237 15,780 28% 64% 10% 
      
 20,276 NA NA 73% 11% 
AZNM 19,691 3,840 39% 68% 14% 
 19,141 7,680 39% 62% 17% 
      
 6,751 NA NA 86% 7% 
RMPP 6,000 4,650 41% 61% 20% 
 5,374 9,300 41% 26% 37% 
 
 
Across the regions, the reduction in thermal capacity averages about 15% of the new installed 
wind capacity, with relatively little variation across regions. It is important to mention again, 
however, the strong assumption made here that hydro output, particularly in the NWPP region, 
would not adjust to the new intermittent capacity. By taking advantage of the implicit storage 
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potential of the hydro resources, one would expect the equilibrium capacity needs in this region 
to be reduced quite a bit more than implied by this calculation. 
 
5.2 Capacity Market Results 
 
As in the appendix, the simulation of a capacity market requires two important 
parameters to be specified. The first is the energy market price cap, set here to be $1,000/MWh. 
The second important parameter is the capacity market payment made to the generation sources. 
In order to calculate the capacity payment, the implied shortfall that would be created by capping 
prices at $1,000/MWh is first estimated.4  
 In practice, capacity payments are intended to replace the revenues necessary for 
investment that are in principle denied to suppliers through either explicit or implicit restraints on 
energy prices (see Joskow 2005; Oren 2005). For this study, this was accomplished by 
calculating the total revenues of peaking generation sources under the energy-only scenarios 
described above. Next, a counterfactual level of income for a 1 MW peaking generator that 
would have resulted from the same investment levels is calculated, but with prices earned by 
generators capped at $1,000. The difference, sometimes known in industry jargon as the 
“missing money” caused by price caps, can be expressed as a dollars-per-kilowatt-year ($/kWy) 
value. This value was used as the capacity payment in the second set of simulations. These 
payments are summarized in Table 6.  
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Table 6. Capacity payments resulting from $1,000 price cap (in $/kWy) 
 No new 14% of 28% of 
 wind CEMS CEMS 
    
CA 58.41 54.58 55.84 
NWPP 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AZNM 1.15 1.57 12.06 
RMPP 0.00 2.53 24.80 
 
 
 
It is worth noting that these values are quite a bit lower than those currently seen in U.S. 
electricity markets. One reason for this is that the investment numbers from the EIA represent 
generic investment costs for the country, while capacity markets tend to operate in regions of the 
United States, such as California and New York, where investment can be much more costly. 
Another more important driver is that these equilibrium simulations are allowing the price to rise 
above the marginal cost of a peaking plant more frequently than has been historically seen in 
these markets. This is a reflection of the fact that the model determines the equilibrium, break-
even level of capacity, whereas today’s markets tend to feature more capacity than this level. In 
practice, today’s capacity markets do not attempt to differentiate among causes of revenue 
shortfalls; they usually calculate net costs of entry based on historic energy prices.5 Therefore, 
the revenues lost to the price cap in this simulation produce less missing money than has been 
estimated from current capacity market proceedings. 
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Next, the above simulations are repeated, with two adjustments to the original model 
summarized by equations (4) and (5) in the appendix at the end of this chapter. The most striking 
results are naturally found in the hours that were formally those with prices significantly above 
$1,000. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the changes to the peak hour price duration curves for the CA 
and RMPP regions because of both wind penetration and the capacity market policies. These 
figures summarize the 150 highest price hours in each market, in order from highest to lowest. 
Note that prices in these figures are on a logarithmic scale because of the high volatility. 
 
Figure 8. Highest 150 prices CA 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE] 
 
Figure 9. Highest 150 prices RMPP 
[INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE] 
 
For the wind scenarios, the same hours are plotted. As is clear from these figures, the highest 
price hours in the baseline simulations are not those producing the highest prices as wind 
investment increases. This reflects that fact that as wind investment increases, prices are 
increasingly driven by wind availability as well as total end-use demand. This is particularly true 
for the RMPP region, where the highest price hours under high levels of wind investment rank 
below the 100th highest price hours without the wind investment. These figures also illustrate the 
impact that the price cap has on these “scarcity price” hours. In general, the highest price hours 
are reduced to the cap levels, and price levels in most other hours remain unchanged. The impact 
of these capacity market elements on investment levels are summarized in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Investment Levels with a Capacity Market 
 Thermal New wind 
Wind 
capacity Share Share 
 
Capacity 
(MW)  
Capacity 
(MW) factor coal CT 
 23,421 N/A N/A 43% 44% 
CA 23,141 5,670 33% 36% 50% 
 22,817 11,340 33% 28% 55% 
      
 14,472 N/A N/A 93% 0% 
NWPP 13,188 7,890 28% 81% 4% 
 12,237 15,780 28% 64% 10% 
      
 20,282 N/A N/A 73% 11% 
AZNM 19,691 3,840 39% 68% 14% 
 19,168 7,680 39% 62% 17% 
      
 6,751 N/A NA 86% 7% 
RMPP 6,001 4,650 41% 61% 20% 
 5,383 9,300 41% 26% 37% 
Note: MW = megawatts. 
5.3 Revenues of Wind Resources 
Because individual wind plants will have varying profiles across and within regions, it is 
difficult to make general statements about the equilibrium revenues of wind plants. Nevertheless, 
the earnings are estimated of a hypothetical 1 MW “portfolio” of plants that features the same 
production profile as the regional aggregate profile used to construct the residual demand.  
In order to evaluate the revenues of intermittent resources under a capacity market paradigm, 
further assumptions are needed about how the reliable capacity of those resources, on which the 
capacity payment is based, is measured. The most basic, and clearly overgenerous, method 
would be to assume that 100% of the installed capacity was eligible for capacity payments. 
Given the intermittent availability of wind resources, this is not the usual approach. A more 
conventional approach is to discount the installed capacity according to a historical measure of 
the capacity factor (average energy output divided by capacity) of either the specific unit or the 
 27 
class of technologies from which the unit is drawn. Even this approach can overstate the “value” 
of capacity if the production profile of a generation unit is negatively correlated with total system 
load. A third approach, similar to one recently adopted for the purposes of measuring wind and 
solar capacity in California, is to measure the production of resources only during high demand 
hours, discarding production statistics for other hours.6 
For purposes of comparison, revenues have been calculated under a capacity market in two ways, 
roughly following the options outlined above. The first approach discounts the capacity payment 
according to the annual capacity factor, derived from the wind profile data. The second approach 
calculates a capacity factor only for hours 14 through 17 of each day. The results for the two 
alternative calculations of capacity factor (using annual average and peak hour average) were 
very similar, so only the revenues are reported, assuming capacity payments are based on the 
peak hour average capacity factor. 
Table 8 summarizes the revenues of this hypothetical average wind turbine for each region. 
These values are given in terms of $/kWy. By comparison, the peaking units are earning 
$95.82/kWy, while coal plants are earning $282.17/kWy.7 To the extent that actual costs of new 
wind facilities would exceed these equilibrium investment revenue levels, the difference would 
have to be captured in subsidies—either through the production tax credit or through price 
premiums paid by utilities in order to comply with their renewable portfolio standards. As further 
reference, using the same assumptions and cost estimates from the EIA as were used to calculate 
thermal annual fixed costs, wind costs would be roughly $231/kWy.  
Note that under the energy-only market, the revenues for an average profile wind plant decline in 
each region. This is because prices are being influenced increasingly by wind availability, and a 
profile that mirrors the system wind profile would be producing during hours of glut and not 
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producing during hours of wind production shortfall. If revenues are instead based on a 
combination of capped energy market revenues and capacity payments, wind producers do a 
little better than under the energy-only paradigm. This is a much stronger effect under the high 
wind penetration scenarios.8 Revenues in the RMPP area are about 5% higher with a capacity 
payment. This is in part because the capacity payment rewards production during high demand 
hours, whereas the energy-only market rewards production during high price hours. As wind 
penetration increases, the high price hours are relatively more focused on low wind hours than on 
high demand hours. 
 
Table 8. Summary of the revenues of the hypothetical “average” wind turbine ($/kWy)  
 
  Energy-only  
  New wind New wind 
Region CEMS load 14% of CEMS 28% of CEMS 
CA 113.24 112.11 109.27 
NWPP 123.49 106.48 105.17 
AZNM 138.31 135.00 132.75 
RMPP 158.39 142.03 135.17 
    
    
  
Capacity 
Market  
  New Wind New Wind 
Region CEMS load 
14% of 
CEMS 
28% of 
CEMS 
CA 126.74 124.82 122.31 
NWPP 123.49 106.48 105.17 
AZNM 138.35 135.59 136.27 
RMPP 158.39 143.02 144.36 
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5.4 Impact of a Carbon Market 
The last scenario examined is the application of a price of CO2 onto the electricity sector. For the 
purposes of this discussion, the source of the CO2 price could be either a cap-and-trade 
mechanism or a CO2 tax. Rather than try to calculate a closed-loop equilibrium price for CO2, it 
is assumed that these regions participate in broader CO2 markets with a price of $25/ton. This 
value is approximately the 2012 futures price for one ton in the European Union’s Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) market for CO2. It is also assumed that the imposition of CO2 prices 
affects only marginal and not capital or fixed costs of any of the thermal generation technologies.  
The same approach as before can be used to calculate the resulting equilibrium investment levels 
of thermal capacity and revenues for wind facilities. Only the equilibrium is calculated under the 
energy-only market paradigm. Figure 10 illustrates the equilibrium investment capacities under 
the different wind scenarios. Note that coal is much less used in all markets and is driven out of 
the CA and RMPP markets completely under high wind penetration. 
  
Figure 10. Equilibrium capacity investment with $25/ton CO2 
[INSERT FIGURE 10.10	  HERE ] 
 
Table 9 summarizes the energy market revenues earned by the hypothetical wind plant under 
various levels of wind penetration. With the $25/ton carbon price, wind revenues are 
substantially higher overall. The degradation of these revenues with increasing wind penetration 
is also more pronounced, however. With a price on CO2, revenues in the RMPP region are only 
5% lower per kilowatt-year under high wind penetration than they would be for the first 
megawatt of wind capacity added to that region. This is contrasted to the almost 15% decline in 
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revenues for the same comparison in the absence of a carbon market. With carbon at $25/ton, 
wind resources are able to earn relatively more revenues during even off-peak hours when coal 
would be setting the price. Increasing wind penetration leads to more of these hours, but the 
differential between these off-peak and on-peak hours is smaller than in the absence of a carbon 
price. 
 
Table 9. Wind revenues with carbon price at $25/ton (in $/kWy) 
  New wind New wind 
Region CEMS load 14% of CEMS 28% of CEMS 
CA 194.15 193.00 185.29 
NWPP 188.06 173.46 172.81 
AZNM 231.09 228.41 227.96 
RMPP 251.85 246.10 238.87 
 
 
5.5 Estimating the Cost of Energy Availability Profiles      
Given that the equilibrium mix of generation resources can be quite different with high 
penetration of wind resources, it is natural to ask what the costs impacts of this changing mix 
might be. This question is addressed by comparing two hypothetical scenarios. First the total and 
average costs of serving the residual demand (e.g., that which is left over after the new energy is 
applied) are calculated under the assumption that new energy appears in a manner consistent 
with the two wind penetration scenarios described above. In other words, the average cost of 
constructing and operating thermal plants to meet the demand that is not met by the renewable 
production is calculated. Second, the same amount of energy is used as in the wind scenarios, but 
instead assuming that it is applied as a base load supply source. In other words the “new” energy 
is distributed evenly across all hours.  
 31 
The results of this calculation are summarized in Table 10. The columns labeled “As wind” refer 
to the same wind distributions that have been applied to previous results, and  those labeled “as 
base load” show the results for the evenly distributed energy. Because the more volatile wind 
profiles require the construction of fewer base load plants and less frequent operation of peaking 
plants, average costs are higher under the wind profiles. In California, average costs from the 
variability of supply increase about 4% ($3/MWh) under 14% wind penetration and close to 9% 
($7/MWh) with high wind penetration. In the high-penetration RMPP region, costs rise close to 
25% under the high-wind-penetration scenario. 
 
Table 10. Impact of Intermittancy on Average Thermal Costs ($/MWh)  
 New energy 14% of CEMS load New energy 28% of CEMS load 
 As base load As wind As base load As wind 
California 75.73 78.61 81.87 88.92 
NWPP 57.70 59.20 59.02 63.56 
AZNM 59.89 61.05 60.71 63.37 
RMPP 57.71 63.09 62.28 85.11 
  With carbon at $25/ton   
California 100.26 102.78 106.46 107.18 
NWPP 82.16 83.57 83.15 87.31 
AZNM 84.82 85.76 85.56 87.61 
RMPP 83.43 88.20 88.43 104.92 
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6. Conclusions 
The increasing deployment of renewable resources whose intermittent production is 
determined by natural forces will reshape the economics of power generation in developed 
electricity markets. This chapter has presented calculations on what the optimal mix of major 
conventional generation sources would be under various assumptions of end-use demand and 
penetration of wind generation. Data on actual demand for thermal generation in the western 
United States were combined with highly detailed estimates of production from new wind 
resources for this region of the country. The result is a load shape with relatively higher spreads 
between peak and average demand for thermal production. As demonstrated in the equilibrium 
model, the amount of coal-fired base load production that would be an economical equilibrium 
investment steadily declines as wind penetration increases. The reliance on the low-capital-cost 
combustion turbine technology increases.  
Another key change in the economics of power systems will come from the rising importance of 
intermittent production as a driver of market prices. As these simulations demonstrate, the 
availability (or lack) of wind resources will be an important contributor to market clearing prices. 
The normal relationship between end-use demand levels and market prices becomes redefined as 
wind resources grow to take a substantial share of the market. Implications of this are that wind 
resources that are “typical,” in the sense that their output is correlated with the bulk of other wind 
resources, will earn less, and the total capacity of wind resources is ramped up. Their production 
will be correlated with hours of surplus and therefore increasingly less correlated with prices. In 
the presence of a capacity market, this effect is more muted. This is because capacity markets—
at least at present—award capacity payments based on availability during high-demand periods, 
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rather than high-price periods. This too may change, however, as the underlying economics of 
the energy markets become more strongly influenced by the ebbs and flows of intermittent 
generation. 
Overall, increasing reliance on intermittent resources creates, or increases, costs in a fashion 
similar to that caused by fluctuating end-use demand. In planning to serve a system where 
consumption fluctuates widely, firms must turn to resources that are more flexible, but also more 
expensive on an average cost basis. While the added costs associated with fluctuating end-use 
demand can be greatly mitigated by enabling price-responsive consumption, the intermittency of 
renewable supply is a fact of nature. Storage technologies can play a valuable role here, and 
estimates such as those developed in this chapter can provide an indication of the potential value 
of such storage options. 
Although the analysis in this chapter was grounded in data taken from actual energy markets, it 
is important to recognize the limitations of this exercise. Two important elements of some 
electricity markets are missing here, although their effects work in opposite directions. The 
short-term operational constraints of thermal generation units have not been modeled. The 
presence of such constraints would tend to favor the nimble combustion turbine technology even 
more heavily. Also not modeled is the potential reallocation of production from energy-limited 
resources, namely hydroelectric. In the Pacific Northwest in particular, this will be an important 
resource that can go a long way toward counteracting the effects of intermittent generation. In 
fact, even with these limitations, the effects of wind penetration in the NWPP region are 
relatively minor in contrast to the wind-rich but hydro-poor Rocky Mountain region. The 
potential for increased trade among the regions also has not been modeled, although such trade 
will be limited by the availability of transmission capacity. 
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Of course, the real western United States is not starting from scratch in building its investment 
portfolios. Outside of California, coal-fired generation is a currently a mainstay of electric 
companies west of the Mississippi. To the extent that these results portend changes in the 
economics of these technologies, they would affect the earnings of the owners of these 
technologies more than the actual mix of generation resources.  
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Appendix: An Equilibrium Model of Generation Investment 
This appendix describes the technical derivation of the equilibrium investment model employed 
for the results presented above. Each conventional generation technology, indexed by i, features 
a marginal cost ci and fixed cost of capacity Fi. Firms invest in capacity that serves a market with 
demand that fluctuates over time periods t ∈ (1…T ) with some degree of price elasticity. 
Demand at time period Qt(pt) is represented as  
 
Qt(pt) = at – f(pt) 
 
where at is an additive shift of demand and f(pt) is a function of market price pt.  
 The perfectly competitive firms in the model continue to add production in any given 
hour, and capacity overall, as long as the revenues from adding the production or capacity 
exceed the costs. In equilibrium, therefore, production levels in any hour will be set such that the 
marginal cost of production equals the market price. This equilibrium point can be represented 
with the following complementarity condition: 
 
qit ≥ 0 ⊥ pt – ci – ψit ≤ 0 ∀ i, t   (1) 
 
where ψit represents the equilibrium shadow value of the capacity of technology i and will never 
be positive if price is below marginal costs ci.  This is the shadow price on the constraint that 
production be no greater than installed capacity, as reflected in the following condition: 
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ψit ≥ 0 ⊥ qi t – Ki ≤ 0 ∀ i, t   (2) 
 
Equation (1) is therefore equivalent to setting price equal to marginal operating costs as long as 
production quantities are below the capacity constraint Ki. The equilibrium level of investment 
will arise from the condition that the value of a marginal unit of capacity equals the cost of that 
capacity.  
 
Ki ≥ 0 ⊥ Fi – ∑tψit ≤ 0 ∀ i   (3) 
 
where ∑tψit represents the cumulative value of an extra unit of capacity type i aggregated over all 
time periods. Recall that this value is zero for a given period if the capacity is unneeded in that 
period, which in this model is equivalent to prices falling below the marginal cost of production 
of technology i.  
The equilibrium level of investment and production can be found by simultaneously solving for 
the above three conditions. These conditions form a complementarity problem (see Cottle et al. 
1992) of size t × i. The following sections describe the data used in formulating the empirical 
model. 
 
Market Demand 
Demand is represented with the partial-log function 
 
Qrt (prt) = art – br ln(prt) 
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where r is used to denote the region. The value for b was set at 800 for CA, NWPP, and AZNM, 
and a value of 400 was used for the smaller RMPA. The price elasticity for this functional form 
of demand is equal to br /Qr, so at the mean observed demand level (summarized in Table 1), 
elasticity is about 0.05 in each market. In other words, a nonzero but still very modest level of 
demand response is assumed. One advantage of this functional form of demand is that its 
convexity implies little price response at levels around the marginal costs of generation, but more 
response when prices reach “scarcity” levels over $500/MWh.  
 
Price Caps and Capacity Payments 
The above modeling framework imposes two significant assumptions to reach its equilibrium. 
First, at least some degree of price response from end-use demand is assumed. Second, 
equilibrium energy prices are not constrained in any way and are allowed to rise in order to 
balance supply and demand.  
In modeling a stylized capacity market, the above model is modified in several ways. First, the 
price cap is represented with the addition of a large capacity “fringe” technology with a marginal 
cost of $1,000/MWh. In other words, in addition to actual thermal technologies, i, there is an 
additional complementarity condition similar to equation (1) without the capacity constraint on 
production: 
 
qCAPt ≥ 0 ⊥ cCAP – pt ≤ 0 ∀ t    (4) 
 
where qCAPt is positive only if the price cap level cCAP is binding. The quantity qCAPt can be 
thought of as the energy shortfall caused by the price cap, to be dealt with through either demand 
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rationing or out-of-market transactions. To allow for capacity payments, equation (3) is modified 
so that the annual fixed costs of entry equal energy market revenues plus the capacity payment: 
 
Ki ≥ 0 ⊥ Fi – CAP_PAY – ∑tψit ≤ 0   (5) 
 
The capacity market equilibrium is therefore represented by the simultaneous solution of 
conditions (1), (2), (4), and (5). 
 
Revenues to Wind Producers 
Earnings of the average wind profile are calculated by multiplying the output of wind production 
by the market price for each period. In other words, the energy market earnings of such a 
portfolio can be expressed as  
 
∑t prt * CFrt * Capacityr     (6) 
    
 
where CF refers to the capacity factor of wind in region r at time t.  
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Notes 
1. Private Independent Power Producers (IPPs) own 83% of cumulative wind capacity in the United 
States (Wiser and Bolinger 2009). The passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in 
November 2008 could constitute a major shift in this trend. Among the act’s many provisions was the 
extension of investment tax credit (ITC) for certain forms of renewable generation. The act also allows, 
for the first time, utility companies to take advantage of the ITC, which had previously been reserved only 
for nonutility producers.  
2. The CEMS data are available at www.epa.gov/cems. The Platts datasets, POWERDAT and 
BASECASE, are available via paid subscription service at www.platts.com.  
3. The study assumes a 15% total renewable penetration, but only half of that is estimated to come from 
wind. However, in 2007, about half of the existing energy currently generated in the WECC came from 
non-CEMS sources. So the wind portion of our residual demand profiles is roughly 7.5% of total load in 
the base case, and 15% under the assumption of doubled wind capacity. 
4. The mechanisms and levels for limiting prices varies by market. Markets in the eastern U.S. technically 
limit offer prices to $1,000/MWh. In theory market clearing prices can rise above this level, but they have 
not in practice done so. One hypothesis (Joskow 2005) is that actions taken by operators to preserve 
reliability also coincidently limit prices below “scarcity” levels required to recoup investment costs.  
5. An example of such a calculation for the New York ISO region can be found in NERA (2007). 
6. The newly adopted California rule also uses an exceedance measure, rather than a capacity factor. This 
means that the capacity payment is based on the percentage of peak hours in which production exceeds a 
given threshold (e.g., 70%) of nameplate capacity. Using the data in this discussion, this measure gave 
extreme results, so instead the focus here is on a measure of peak hour capacity factor. 
7. Recall that these are their annual entry costs, and the equilibrium conditions equilibrate net operating 
costs with these annual fixed costs. 
8. The $1,000/MWh price cap was almost never binding in the NWPP and AZNM regions; therefore, the 
results for the energy-only market and capacity markets are virtually the same. These markets have no 
“missing money,” and thus no capacity payment was necessary even with the price cap in place. 
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Figure 1: WECC Subregions
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Figure 2: CEMS Load and Wind Production for July
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Figure 3: CEMS Load and Wind Production for December
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Figure 4: Annual Distribution of CEMS Load net of Wind
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Figure 5: Energy Market Prices for July
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Figure 6: Energy Market Prices for December
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Capacity for Energy Only Market
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Figure 8: Highest 150 prices CA
4
25.000
100.000
1000.000
5000.000
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 0 25 50 75 100 125 150
capacity market energy only
2007 Load with projected Wind
with hi Wind
pr
ice
 ($
/M
W
h)
Number of Hours at or above Load
Graphs by market
Cumulative Prices by Wind Penetration
Figure 9: Highest 150 prices RMPP
4,000 12,000 20,000 4,000 12,000 20,000
Wind at 28%
Wind at 14%
Levels of 2007
Wind at 28%
Wind at 14%
Levels of 2007
Wind at 28%
Wind at 14%
Levels of 2007
Wind at 28%
Wind at 14%
Levels of 2007
AZNM CA
NWPP RMPP
Coal CCGT
CT
Graphs by region
Thermal Capacity by Wind Penetration Level
Figure 10: Equilibrium Capacity Investment with $25/ton CO2
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